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NOTE
PENETRATING SEX AND MARRIAGE: THE PROGRESSIVE




Two pure souls fused into one by an impassioned love-friends,
counselors-a mutual support and inspiration to each other amid
life's struggles, must know the highest human happiness;-this is
marriage; and this is the only cornerstone of an enduring home.'
Elizabeth Cady Stanton's century-old feminist vision of marriage as
grounded in companionship remains deeply imbedded in our social con-
sciousness. Society's vision of marriage focuses on love, companionship,
commitment, and romance. People also commonly view marriage as the
legal union of men and women, presumably heterosexuals. Although this
vision of marriage as heterosexual companionship is deeply rooted
within our social consciousness, law does not recognize the love and
companionship model of marriage.2 Neither case law nor statutes requires
marriage to be a union of companions, lovers, friends, partners or even
heterosexuals.3 This disconnect between legal and social understandings
of marriage reveals the heterosexual, companionship model of marriage
as idyllic social myth.
* J.D., University of Denver College of Law, 1998; Judicial Clerk for the Honorable Harold
D. Vietor, United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 1998-2000. I would like to
thank Martha Ertman for assisting me with the development of this Note, without whom it could not
have been written. I would also like to thank Janet Halley, Todd Ingram, and Julie Nice for their
helpful comments; Frank Valdes; and all of the participants of the InterSEXionality Symposium.
1. 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 22 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds., 1881).
2. This Note will demonstrate that in fact love and commitment fail to occupy a
determinative place in formal marriage law. Despite this fact, lawmakers also contribute to the
mythology that legal marriage is about heterosexual love. For example, in the recent debates about
the "marriage penalty," Republican lawmakers referred to the tax as "a tax on love." See Aaron
Zither, GOP Rides Herd on "Love Tax," ROCKY MTN. NEWS, May 3, 1998, at 2A. Despite this
characterization by lawmakers, the institution of marriage does not contain such a requirement.
3. This Note focuses on ceremonial or formal marriage. See infra Part I. In many states,
couples may also form the marital union through common law marriage. See generally Cynthia
Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709
(1996) (discussing the evolution of common law marriage and its current status and desirability for
women).
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Instead of constructing marriage laws around companionship or
identity, family law doctrine constructs marriage around sex.' Specifi-
cally, the act of penis-vagina penetration (PVP) is the essential element
of a valid formal marriage This Note reviews case law and statutes to
reveal that the central criterion for the validation, creation, and recogni-
tion of legal marriage is not love, not companionship, nor heterosexual
identity, but instead the potential to engage in PVP. This Note exposes
this pattern by exploring how the law responds to bisexuality in mar-
riage. Examining bisexuality in marriage exposes the construction of
legal marriage6 as fundamentally sexual, and also reveals the progressive
potential of focussing on bisexuality to undercut legal regulations which
subordinate women and gay people.
Part I presents and analyzes three doctrinal areas that treat PVP as
the determinative factor in legitimizing legal marriage: (1) case law con-
cerning transgender marriage, (2) the Uniform Marriage and Dissolution
Act (UMDA) and corresponding case law, and (3) the Defense of Mar-
riage Act (DOMA). The transgender marriage cases most explicitly make
spouses' potential for PVP the essential criteria for legal marriage. The
UMDA and DOMA more subtly treat PVP as the cornerstone of mar-
riage. Viewing marriage through a bisexual lens exposes the centrality of
the PVP requirement in these contexts. To set the stage for this analysis,
Part I explores multiple permutations of bisexual identity, thus setting the
groundwork for an exploration of how bisexuality offers an under-
utilized tool for progressive analysis of marriage doctrine. Part II ad-
dresses an additional area of legal regulation-immigration-that com-
plicates the questions regarding marriage regulation. Part Ill argues that
notwithstanding marriage's conduct-based (PVP) nature, state courts and
Congress present marriage as status-based, specifically heterosexual
status. Part IV suggests that PVP is an illegitimate and unprincipled basis
for defining legal marriage because it has little to do with the benefits
that flow from marriage. Additionally, the PVP criterion perpetuates the
subordination of women. This Note concludes by arguing that in today's
debate over same-sex marriage, in which moral arguments are used to
convince citizens that only heterosexual companionship is deserving of
society's sanctions, exposing the fact that formal marriage is based on
4. Family law also encompasses divorce regulation; this Note, however, primarily focuses
on the creation of a formal marital union.
5. It has also been similarly argued that marriage is for sex. See Sally F. Goldfarb, Family
Law, Marriage, and Heterosexuality: Questioning the Assumptions, 7 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L.
REV. 285 (1998) (stating that marriage is for "heterosexual genital intercourse" and arguing for
redefining the meaning of marriage in order to open marriage to same-sex couples).
6. This Note limits its analysis to American law. Other countries recognize same-sex
marriage and may define the hallmark of marriage by factors other than PVP. For an exploration of
marriage regulation outside the United States, see Barbara E. Graham-Siegenthaler, Principles of
Marriage Recognition Applied to Same-Sex Marriage Recognition in Switzerland and Europe, 32
CREIGHTON L. REV. 121, 129 (1998).
[Vol. 75:41376
PENETRATING SEX AND MARRIAGE
PVP, a sexual act, should help pave the way for a re-examination of legal
marriage and lifting the ban on same-sex marriage.
I. LEGAL MARRIAGE DEPENDS ON PENIS-VAGINA PENETRATION
An analysis of pertinent doctrine reveals that legal marriage turns on
the ability to engage in one particular sex act: penis-vagina penetration.
Courts explicitly state this, requiring that men possess the "necessary
apparatus"7 in order to be married. Men need this particular apparatus-
the penis-in order to "function as a husband."' In order to be legally
married, couples must possess the capacity to "engage in normal sexual
relations,"9 normal being defined as PVP. Legally married couples find
trouble when the partners cannot continue to sexually fulfill the "mar-
riage contract."' This language, extraordinarily explicit, designates PVP
as the essential characteristic of marriage. Courts and legislators rely on
this requirement to determine which unions to recognize, overlooking
and even dismissing ideals of love, companionship, commitment, and
heterosexual orientation, which received wisdom tells us are central to
marriage.
A. Transgender Marriage
State courts' treatment of transgender" marriage illustrates that the
determinative criteria for granting legal recognition of marriage is the
spouses' potential to engage in PVP. The most striking example of this
fact is the New Jersey Superior Court decision in M.T v. J.T.2 In this
action for spousal support and maintenance, M.T., the plaintiff, was a
male to female transsexual.'3 M.T. was born with male sexual organs but
transitioned to a female identity, completing the transition by surgery
which removed her male genitalia and constructed a vagina." Prior to this
7. See Frances B. v. Mark B., 355 N.Y.S.2d 712, 717 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
8. See id.
9. See id. at 713.
10. See generally Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500-01 (Sup. Ct. 1971). The
marriage contract includes the expectation of sexual relations. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §
587 (1977). This expectation also illustrates that marriage depends on PVP.
11. There is much debate and some consensus regarding the terms transgender and
transsexual. A common definition of the term transsexual is a person who has undergone sex
reassignment surgery (SRS) to change his or her biological sex. See MARTINE ROTHBLATT, THE
APARTHEID OF SEX 17 (1995). The term transgender most commonly describes all those who are
differently gendered, including transsexuals, cross-dressers, and drag queens. See GORDENE OLGA
MACKENZIE, TRANSGENDER NATION 2 (1994). Some scholars and activists prefer not to use the
term transsexual, arguing that it places too much emphasis on genitalia as the defining characteristic
of gender identity. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law:
The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 32 n.130 (1995). This Note discusses
cases including individuals who have undergone SRS, and uses transgender and transsexual
interchangeably.
12. 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
13. M.T., 355 A.2d at 205.
14. Id.
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transition, M.T. met J.T., and informed him of her sexual and gender
identities as they became romantically involved. One year after the sur-
gery, M.T. and J.T. were married in a ceremonial marriage.'5 Following
this marriage, they lived together and had sexual intercourse.'6
As a defense to M.T.'s claim for support, J.T. asserted that his mar-
riage to M.T. was void because she was not female but male.'7 The Juve-
nile and Domestic Relations Court disagreed, finding that M.T. was le-
gally female and ordered J.T. to pay spousal support." J.T. appealed,
arguing once again that M.T. was male. 9
In resolving the maintenance dispute, the New Jersey Superior
Court framed the central issue as whether the marriage between J.T. (a
biological male) and M.T., a postoperative male to female transsexual,
qualified as a legal marriage between a man and woman.' The court
found M.T. to be legally female and therefore eligible to be married to
J.T. Most importantly, the court decided that in determining the sex of a
person, "the anatomical test, the genitalia of an individual, is unques-
tionably significant and probably in most instances indispensable.""' This
factor was most significant for the court because "it is the sexual capacity
of the individual which must be scrutinized."' An individual must be
able to "engage in sexual intercourse either as a male or female."23 In other






20. Id. at 208.
21. Id. But see Corbett v. Corbett, 2 W.L.R. 1306 (P.D.A. 1970). The court in Corbett
determined that a person's sex is decided and fixed at birth. Id. at 1323. The legal validity of a union
for marital purposes, then, depends on a person's chromosomes. Under this view of sex, the sex
change process becomes invisible, invalid, and/or ineffective for purposes of marriage benefits. This
essentialist understanding of sex directly contradicts the thesis of this Note in that it focuses on
chromosomes rather than PVP to define marriage. But Corbett can be distinguished; the British
courts decided the Corbett case. This Note deals with policy and case law from the United States.
Furthermore, the court's reasoning in Corbett mirrors my arguments about why the legal recognition
of marriage is based upon penis-vagina penetration. See infra Parts ml-IV. For example, the court
stated that sex must necessarily be decided based upon biology because a male to female transsexual,
for example, "cannot reproduce a person who is naturally capable of performing the essential role of
a woman in marriage." Id. at 1324-25 (emphasis added). Apparently, the court believed this role to
be child bearing as a consequence of being on the receiving end of PVP. The court treated "biology
as destiny" approach, reducing "the essential role of a woman in marriage" to becoming pregnant
through PVP. The Corbett court's reasoning would fail to explain why sterile women can get
married, or why a woman who had a hysterectomy can receive alimony. For another interpretation of
the Corbett case, see Mary Coombs, Transgenderism and Sexual Orientation: More than a Marriage
of Convenience, 3 NAT'L J. SEXUAL ORIENTATION L. 1 (1997).
22. M.T., 355 A.2d at 209.
23. Id.
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case, M.T. acquired a vagina which allowed for such penetration, so the
court recognized the marriage and ordered J.T. to pay spousal support.'
The emphasis on male to female penetration as the consummate
requirement for marriage can also be seen in Anonymous v. Anonymous.'
The plaintiff, a man, married a person whom he thought was a woman. '
The plaintiff and defendant did not have sexual intercourse before the
marriage, and the day after the marriage ceremony, the plaintiff discov-
ered his spouse possessed male genitalia.27 Notwithstanding this discov-
ery, the parties remained married for some time. Eventually, however,
the plaintiff filed an action requesting the court to annul the marriage.28
The court found for the plaintiff, holding that "the so-called mar-
riage ceremony.., did not in fact or in law create a marriage contract."'29
The court reasoned that the defendant was not female at the time of mar-
riage, and a valid marriage requires the union of a male and a female?"
Furthermore, the court noted that the parties never had a sexual relation-
ship.3' Apparently the court used the term "union" as a euphemism for
PVP. Even though the defendant underwent a sex change operation after
the marriage, but before the annulment action, the initial union did not
constitute a valid marriage. The court granted the annulment not on the
basis of fraud or incapacity, but on the basis that the two were not quali-
fied to be married."
One of the Anonymous court's most revealing statements regarding
the PVP requirement is that "the mere removal of the male organs would
not, in and of itself, change a person into a true female."33 Apparently the
court saw genetic composition as determinative in deciding whether a
person is male or female. Later in the opinion, however, the court re-
counted another court's statement that "the law provides that physical
incapacity for sexual relationship shall be ground for annulling a mar-
riage."' This statement indicates that in determining a person's sex, and
therefore the ability to marry, PVP is the key factor.
24. Id. at 211. The court also stated that the decision to recognize a male to female transsexual
who could sexually function as female "no way disserv[ed] any societal interest, principle of public
order or precept of morality." Id. This statement underscores the operative principle argued in this
Note: When a man is able to penetrate a person with a vagina, legal and moral recognition follow.
25. 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
26. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 499.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 499-500.
29. Id. at 501.
30. Id. at 500.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 501.
33. Id. at 500 (emphasis added).
34. Id. (quoting Mirizio v. Mirizio, 150 N.E. 605 (N.Y. 1926)). The Mirizio court continued
on to say that a marriage relationship should exist with the result and the capacity for the "purpose of
begetting offspring." Mirizio, 150 N.E. at 607. This emphasis on procreation was cited as a policy
reason for the requirements of marriage. For a discussion of this empty justification, see Part I.B.2.b.
19981 1379
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
A third case which focused on the importance of penis-vagina
penetration is Frances B. v. Mark B.35 The plaintiff wife married the de-
fendant husband, believing the defendant to be a man. The wife sought
an annulment when she discovered the husband did not have a penis,
asserting that the defendant "was unable to have normal sexual inter-
course."3 The defendant was a female to male transsexual who had suc-
cessfully obtained a legal name change recognizing his transition. 7 De-
spite the husband's successful social transition, the court granted the
annulment, based upon the defendant's purportedly deficient genitalia.
While the court recognized that the defendant might pass as a man in
society, he could not "function as a husband."3 The court recognized the
transsexual identity, but stated that "[a]ssuming, as urged, that defendant
was a male entrapped in the body of a female, the record does not show
that the entrapped male successfully escaped to enable defendant to per-
form male functions in a marriage."39 The court explained that "hormone
treatments and surgery have not succeeded in supplying the necessary
apparatus to enable defendant to function as a man for purposes of pro-
creation."
The court in Frances B. emphasized two things: the importance of
possessing a penis and of using it for procreative purposes. The holding,
therefore, appears to suggest that the ability to procreate is the basis of a
valid marriage. However, the procreative use of the penis follows only
after the acquisition of the penis, something that the plaintiff alleged, and
the court found, the defendant did not possess. Additionally, the wife's
key argument was that the defendant could not have "normal" sexual
relations. The court recognized the validity of this claim by focusing on
the insufficiency of Mark's male "apparatus." The penis as a tool for
penetration, not procreation, occupied the central place in the court's
analysis. Although the defendant could be recognized as a man in soci-
ety, the marriage could not be legally recognized because the court found
Mark did not possess a penis, which was essential for performing his
marital function of penetrating Frances, with the possibility of procrea-
tion. The court found that Mark's deficient penis prevented him from
engaging in procreative sex. What the court did not say, however, is as
revealing as what it did say. Specifically, the court did not say that the
35. 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
36. Mark B., 355 N.Y.S.2d at 713 (emphasis added). The wife also sought an annulment based
upon the fact that the defendant did not possess sexual organs. Id.
37. Id. at 714. The court granted a name change from Marsha to Mark after the defendant filed
a petition explaining his emotional and physical condition as not female, but male. See id. Changing
the sex on a birth certificate is also a pressing issue for many transgendered people, and courts
sometimes refer to birth certificates to verify sex when deciding whether to grant a marriage license.
See In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987).
38. Mark B., 355 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
39. Id. at 717 (emphasis added).
40. Id. (emphasis added).
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central requirement for marriage was the ability to procreate and since
Mark could not procreate, the marriage was invalid. Instead, the court
focussed on possessing the proper genitalia and then using this genitalia.
After meeting these two preconditions, procreation could follow.
This summary of transgender marriage cases illustrates courts' em-
phasis on PVP as the central element in determining the validity of mar-
riage." While some of these cases have discussed the ability to procreate
as a necessary component of the marital relationship, this component is
discussed within the context of penis-vagina sexual intercourse. In other
words, it is not procreation itself that concerns the courts, but rather that
procreation happens through penis-vagina sexual penetration. Thus, PVP
functions as a necessary precondition for the method of procreation dis-
cussed and advocated by the courts. 2 Nowhere do these cases discuss
whether the parties loved each other, were committed to one another, or
were companions at the time of marriage, or sufficiently possessed a
"heterosexual" orientation. In fact, discussions regarding sexual orienta-
tion are conspicuously absent from the cases, and instead the courts' de-
cisions regarding marriage validity rest on conduct.
41. One United States case, in addition to the British case previously discussed, see supra note
21, dismisses the relevance of penis-vagina penetration as a criteria of determining a valid marriage
and instead relies on the chromosomal make-up of the parties. See In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828
(Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987). In Ladrach, a post-operative male to female (mtf) transsexual attempted to
marry a male. The court held that the two individuals could not marry each other because they were
of the same sex. Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d at 832. In finding that the parties were of the same sex, the
court relied on the likely chromosomal make-up of the mtf transsexual. According to a doctor's
testimony, the mtf transsexual would most likely not possess the chromosomes of a female. Id. at
830. Also, the court noted that the mtf transsexual's birth certificate reflected a male sex. Id. at 831-
32. This fact, along with the likelihood of the chromosomal composition, provided the court with
support for its holding. Moreover, when describing the case, the court dismissed the fact that the mtf
transsexual possessed a vagina and, therefore, could engage in penis-vagina penetrative sex. Id. at
830-32. This case does not support this Note's PVP conclusion. However, of the handful of cases
that have been decided on this issue, Ladrach exists as an outlier and minority view.
42. The importance of PVP has also been discussed by the United States Supreme Court. See
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). In Turner, the Court addressed whether the fundamental right
of marriage can be burdened to a greater degree for prisoners than for non-prisoners. The regulation
at issue in Turner allowed a prisoner to marry only with the approval of the prison superintendent.
Turner, 482 U.S. at 82. The Court held the regulation to be unconstitutional. Id. at 97. In so doing,
the Court discussed the "essential attributes" of marriage and the ability of these attributes to be
preserved in the prison context. The Court stated that "[m]any important attributes of marriage
remain, however, after taking into account the limitations imposed by prison life." Id. at 95. These
elements included: (1) expressions of support and commitment, (2) an exercise of spirituality or
religion, and (3) the expectation that most marriages will be "fully consummated" upon the inmates'
release. Id. at 95-96. Emphasizing the expectation for consummation, the Court focused on the act
of PVP. While it is unclear how the Court prioritized these elements (especially in light of the
Court's statement of "most" instead of "all" in the consummation context), the Court assumed that
marriage, in general, is granted with the expectation that there will be penetration. If an inmate was
never able to consummate a marriage, because he or she was on death row for example, it is unlikely
the Court would affirm such a union.
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B. PVP Through the Lens of Bisexuality
Like the transgender marriage cases, the UMDA and cases inter-
preted directly under the act, and DOMA, also treat PVP as the determi-
native element of a legal marriage. Unlike the transgender cases, how-
ever, in the UMDA and DOMA marriage is not constructed as explicitly
dependent on PVP. But a careful analysis revealed through the lens of
bisexuality shows that PVP is the determining factor for judges and
lawmakers in these contexts as well, even if more subtly than in the
transgender marriage cases.
1. Understanding Bisexuality
At the most basic level, bisexuals 3 can be described as having the
potential to sexually desire both men and women. More specifically,
bisexuals refuse or fail to choose a specific gender or sex as the object of
their desire. Their sexual desire refuses the binary sexual construction of
desire.
Bisexual identity can exist in many permutations." This Note fo-
cuses on legally married bisexuals, but there are numerous other permu-
tations including single bisexual people and bisexual men and women in
same-sex relationships. The many permutations complicate an under-
standing of bisexuality. 5 Since few legal scholars have undertaken the
43. Attempting to define or unpack the label "bisexual" is tricky business. Many components
comprise identity, including legal status, desire, behavior, and perception. See generally John H.
Gagnon, Gender Preferences in Erotic Relations: The Kinsey Scale and Sexual Scripts, in
HOMOSEXUALITY/HETEROSEXUALrIY 177 (David P. McWhirter et al. eds., 1990) (discussing
aspects of identity and the Kinsey scale which measured identity based upon conduct and fantasies).
44. For a poststructural account of identity in general, see AFFER IDENTITY: A READER IN
LAW AND CULTURE (Dan Danielsen & Karen Engle eds., 1995). Queer theory has persuasively
demonstrated the dangers of relying on identity and theorizing around its constructions. See, e.g.,
Lisa Duggan, Making It Perfectly Queer, in SEx WARS: SEXUAL DISSENT AND POLITICAL CULTURE
155 (Lisa Duggan & Nan D. Hunter eds., 1995) (arguing against a political or legal movement based
on an idea that sexual identity is "unitary" or "essential"). But see Suzanna Danuta Walters, From
Here to Queer: Radical Feminism, Postmodernism, and the Lesbian Menace (Or, Why Can't a
Woman Be More Like a Fag?), in SIGNS, Summer 1996, at 830, 837 (arguing that the politics of
feminism and lesbian-feminism are at risk of being lost with the "deconstruction of the cohesion of
identity"). This Note does not directly enter into this debate, but does strategically depend upon the
existence (whether "real" or not) of a discreet and identifiable bisexual identity at some level to
make the larger point about legal marriage. By using bisexual identity in this way, this Note engages
in what has been called "strategic essentialism." See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Subaltern Studies:
Deconstructing Historiography, in SELECTED SUBALTERN STUDIES 3, 13-15 (Ranajit Guha &
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak eds., 1988).
45. The term bisexual implies a desire based upon a person's sex. This term simplifies the
components of desire. For example, the number of bi-categories increases dramatically when a
transgendered person has a bi-identity or a non-transgendered person desires a same-gender,
transgendered person. In the case of transgender bi-desire, bisexual fails to capture such an
experience. Bi-gender or bi-gender identity may be more applicable. A discussion of transgender
identity and politics is beyond the scope of this paper. For an excellent article discussing transgender
1382 [Vol. 75:4
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project of deconstructing the complex nature of bisexual identity, ' the
following section attempts to fill this gap by presenting some of the per-
mutations of bisexual identity to illustrate that marriage is based on PVP.
For purposes of this Note, the term "identity bisexual" refers to a
person who has refused to choose a gay or straight sexual orientation,
and thus the term refers to a person's orientation and potential desire for
both men and women,' not the many ways a bisexual may choose to live
his or her sexual life. The term "opposite-sexed bisexual" describes a
person who has a bisexual orientation but is currently partnered with an
opposite sex person. In the same vein, the term "same-sexed bisexual"
describes a person who has a bisexual orientation but is currently part-
nered with a person of the same sex."
identity issues, see Hasan Shafiqullah, Note, Shape-Shifters, Masqueraders, & Subversives: An
Argument for the Liberation of Transgendered Individuals, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 195 (1997).
46. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
47. When I refer to opposite-sex and same-sex identities and relationships throughout this
paper, I am relying on the traditional and conventional acceptance and understanding that there are
only two sexes. I realize, however, that this is not biologically correct. See Anne Fausto-Sterling,
The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female Are Not Enough, in THE MEANING OF DIFFERENCE 68
(Karen E. Rosenblum et al. eds., 1996) (presenting empirical evidence that at least five sexes
comprise the human race). This Note reveals that the entire body of family law marriage doctrine
depends on the two-sex supposition. For this reason, Fausto-Sterling's work is monumental in
showing that not only is the requirement of opposite sexed unions unprincipled because of the PVP
requirement, the requirement is based upon an incorrect and flawed supposition. Fausto-Sterling
states: "Western culture is deeply committed to the idea that there are only two sexes .... [T]oday it
means being. .. subject to a number of laws governing marriage, the family, and human intimacy."
Id. at 68. If this reality were to be acknowledged, the entire basis for legal regulation of human
relationships would change. "Imagine that the sexes have multiplied beyond currently imaginable
limits .... It would have to be a world of shared powers .... [M]ale and female, heterosexual and
homosexual-all those oppositions and others would have to be dissolved as sources of division." Id.
at 72. This Note uses such terms not to reify their mistaken meanings but instead to operate with
common understandings of sex and relationships.
This Note will also refer to heterosexual orientation and heterosexuality. Such terms assume a
lifetime of primary and/or exclusive opposite sex partnership or desire. In reality, even a person who
exclusively partnered with the opposite sex may desire both women and men. Yet for the purposes
of simplicity, this Note assumes this person has a heterosexual orientation. Additional terms could
apply in other situations as well. "Functional heterosexual" could refer to a person who may sexually
desire both sexes but has spent the majority of his or her recent life partnered with an opposite-sex
person. "Social heterosexual" could refer to a person who, regardless of sexual orientation, moves
through the world assumed to be heterosexual, because they often do not come out as gay, lesbian, or
bisexual. All of these terms illustrate the fluid and dynamic nature of sexual orientation identities.
Viewing sexual orientation, specifically bisexuality, as multidimensional and multifaceted can serve
a broader liberational goal. What these terms do not show, however, is the legal construction of
sexual orientation, specifically in the marriage context.
Finally, the term "legally unionized" could describe a person who has received state sanction
for his or her partnership. In other words, a "legally unionized" person is a legally married person.
This term does not establish any meaning particular to the sexual orientation of the spouses. Instead
the term refers to the legal status given to a person and a couple by the state. The term "legally
unionized" is more precise than marriage because marriage is constructed as and conflated with
heterosexual orientation, which I later show and deconstruct. See infra Part 1I1. Despite the efficacy
of the term "legally unionized," I will continue to refer to marriage as marriage in order to
deconstruct the term.
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Bisexuals are essential and unique players in analyzing and under-
standing legal marriage. Despite this unique role, the diametrical opposi-
tion between gay and straight has been, according to Eve Kosofsky
Sedgwick, a crucial element of modem Western culture.4 ' According to
Sedgwick, twentieth-century thought cannot be understood without un-
derstanding the relationship between homosexual and heterosexual: 9
"[A] whole cluster of the most crucial sites for the contestation of mean-
ing in twentieth-century Western culture are consequentially and quite
indelibly marked with the historical specificity of homoso-
cial/homosexual definition.. . ."' This duality of homosexual and het-
erosexual lies at the heart of our "modem cultural organization."5 Iden-
tity bisexuals, however, do not fall on either end of this diametric oppo-
sition. This organizing principle, nevertheless, serves as one of the bases
for labeling bisexuals as either gay or straight, depending on the sex of
their partners or the purpose of the classification. Although identity bi-
sexuals have refused to choose, they have been forced into one of the
only two options, heterosexual or homosexual. This coercive classifica-
tion is not surprising since, based on Sedgwick's analysis, bisexuality
challenges the very nature of our cultural organization. Accepting a bi-
sexual orientation forces an expansion of dualistic thinking52 and exposes
the permeability of traditionally recognized identity boundaries. If
Sedgwick is right, bisexuality also undermines fundamental classifica-
tions that inform Western thought. Since the stakes of maintaining the
homo/hetero duality are so high, an analysis of how bisexual identity is
treated has much to offer queer theory.
Identity bisexuals have come out and challenged the omnipresent
nature of bipolar social construction.53 The bisexual challenges to binary
thinking about sexuality have met with considerable success, at least to
the extent that bisexuals are lumped into the "gay" side of the so-
cial/sexual ledger. Most gay pride parade banners and many gay com-
munity centers recognize bisexuality. Sexual orientation anti-
All of these terms are admittedly underinclusive. For example, it is possible that one person
could simultaneously be referred to as an: "identity bisexual," "opposite-sexed bisexual," "social
heterosexual," "functional heterosexual," and "legally unionized." It would be much easier to refer
to such a person as either a "bisexual" or "heterosexual" depending on their partner status. The fact
that a person could hypothetically fit into all of these categories at once, however, underscores the
complexity of identity and need for a deeper understanding and more detailed representation of
bisexuals.
48. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet, in THE LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES
READER 45 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993).
49. Id. at 48.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Ruth Colker, A Bi Jurisprudence, in HYBRID: BISEXUALS, MULTIRACIALS, AND
OTHER MISFITS UNDER AMERICAN LAW 15 (1996).
53. For comments on bisexual identity, see id.
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discrimination laws protect bisexuals.' Queer scholarship is also begin-
ning to include work about bisexuality." Yet, ironically, queer scholar-
ship provides one of the starkest examples of bisexuality invisibility. 6
Bisexuals continue to be misunderstood because of the traditional dual-
istic social construction of sexual orientation identity itself.
One social construction of bisexuals is that they are heterosexual.
Identity bisexuals are most often constructed in such a way when an
identity bisexual legally marries a person of the opposite sex (thereby
becoming an "opposite-sexed," "legally unionized" bisexual according to
this Note's classification terms) and receives the state-generated privi-
leges and benefits reserved for opposite-sex married couples. In this case,
however, a bisexual person does not change his or her orientation. Upon
marriage, this person could identify and be viewed as "legally unionized"
(the beneficiary of governmental benefits) rather than heterosexual. An
opposite-sexed, legally-unionized bisexual would be assumed to be het-
erosexual until and unless s/he publicly came out as bisexual. In other
words, a default rule presumes that being married means that the spouses
are heterosexual. This default rule both mischaracterizes bisexuality and
perpetuates the exclusivity of the marriage institution.
The diverse terms capable of describing various permutations of bi-
sexuality illustrate the fluidity of bisexuality but also of sexual orienta-
tion in general (including heterosexuality). When one considers that
identity bisexuals can and do freely enter and exit a legal union, the my-
thology that marriage is exclusively by and for heterosexuals gets desta-
bilized. Such destabilization "is an important goal that can be partly ac-
complished by an emphasis on acts."" Applying this idea here (i.e.,
54. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 363.02-03 (West 1997).
55. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, A Bisexual Jurisprudence, 3 LAW & SEXUALITY 127 (1993);
Naomi Mezey, Dismantling the Wall: Bisexuality and the Possibilities of Sexual Identity
Classification Based on Acts, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 98 (1995).
56. See generally Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and
Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REV. 561 (1997) (failing to include
bisexuals as meaningful participants in the creation of legal theory and to substantively distinguish
how they might be the same or different in perpetuating the racism criticized).
57. See supra note 47, see also infra Part I.B.2.b. The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)
assumes that those who marry are heterosexual. Labeling bisexuals as heterosexual, specifically
when married, does not accurately reflect the position of bisexuals in society generally because
bisexuals continue to be at risk of discrimination based on their orientation, not marital status. See
infra note 107. In fact, bisexuals are often singled out for biased treatment, notwithstanding marital
status. In the spring of 1994, the mayor of St. Paul, Minnesota, refused to sign a "gay rights"
proclamation because of the inclusion of bisexuals and transgendered persons. See Anthony
Lonetree, Coleman Won't Sign Gay Month Proclamation, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR-TRIB., May
4, 1994, at lB. The mayor stated that he would have signed the measure if it included only gays and
lesbians because their identity was a "sexual orientation" deserving of "protected class" status. Id.
Bisexuality, according to the mayor, was instead a "lifestyle issue" which does not deserve legal
protection. Id. The mayor further stated that including bisexuals under the rubric of "gay and
lesbian" represented the ultimate of "political correctness." ld.
58. Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v.
Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1771 (1993).
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adopting a number of terms for bisexuals depending on the acts of part-
nering) can destabilize marriage by showing the institution depends upon
acts, rather than a particular sexual orientation. Revealing that identity
bisexuals legally marry opposite sex partners disrupts the myth that mar-
riage is a union based on heterosexual status.
2. Legal Marriage Under the UMDA and DOMA Depends Upon PVP
States traditionally regulate the confines of legal marriage.59 In two
instances, however, legal marriage has occupied national and federal
attention. First, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws adopted the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA),
which serves as the model for state marriage laws.' Second, Congress
passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)6' which supplanted tradi-
tional state jurisdiction over marriage and family regulation by defining
marriage as an opposite-sex union for federal purposes and supporting
states that ban same-sex marriage. Under both DOMA and judicial inter-
pretations of the UMDA, the dispositive criteria used to determine the
legitimacy of a legal marriage is the potential for or actual vaginal pene-
tration by a penis. Opposite-sexed bisexuals best reveal this point be-
cause they frequently receive the benefits and privileges of legal mar-
riage without fitting the social description of eligible individuals (i.e.,
heterosexuals). When they enter the marriage institution as bisexuals,"
they show that sexual orientation is immaterial to the defining character-
istics of marriage. Bisexuals illustrate that PVP, rather than sexual ori-
entation, is the key element of a legal marriage, necessitating a careful
59. See Steven K. Homer, Note, Against Marriage, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 505, 515-19
(1994). See generally Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There's No Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 27
(1996) (discussing marriage as a fundamental right and the social benefits and constitutional
ramifications potentially arising from the abolition of marriage); Scott Ruskay-Kidd, The Defense of
Marriage Act and the Overextension of Congressional Authority, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1435, 1469-75
(1997) (discussing the roles of the states and federal government in regulating marriage). A live
question exists whether the legal significance of marriage emanates from the United States
Constitution or from the bundle of state-conferred rights and entitlements to legally recognized
partnered individuals. The Supreme Court has recognized opposite sex marriage as a fundamental
right. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
Regardless of the source of the legal significance of the marital bond, states traditionally regulate the
institution.
60. The UMDA was originally ratified by a national body entitled the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1970 and then amended twice by the same national body.
At least eight states have adopted, at least in part, the UMDA including Arizona, Colorado, Illinois,
Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, and Washington. See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
Acr, 9A pt. I U.L.A. 1 (1998) (providing table of jurisdictions adopting the act).
61. P.L. No. 104-199, § 2, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at I U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. H 1996) and
28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West Supp. 1998)).
62. This ability is not limited to bisexuals. Gays and lesbians also could freely enter the
institution if they wished to do so with an opposite sex partner. Bisexuals are best situated, however,
to play this subversive role because they are genuine participants in the mythology of marriage as
romantic, love and commitment based. The main point here is that marriage laws do not consider, or
even reject, sexual orientation on its face.
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review of marriage doctrine. This exploration reveals that love and com-
panionship fail to occupy a central, significant, or even minimal place in
legal marriage.
a. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
The UMDA63 outlines regulations for marriage and divorce. The
UMDA purports to "strengthen and preserve the integrity of marriage
and safeguard family relationships"' and defines marriage as a "personal
relationship between a man and a woman."65 Evidence of a valid mar-
riage under the act can take the form of reputation, cohabitation, or the
acknowledgment of the parties.' The UMDA does not explicitly prohibit
same-sex marriage. 7 Many courts, however, reason that the generally
accepted definition of marriage as opposite-sex as defined by the UMDA
precludes legal recognition of same-sex relationships.68 Opposite-sexed
bisexuals, however, can and do legally marry under the UMDA.
Facially, the UMDA does not require that the parties to a marriage
love or even like eachother. Instead, the UMDA allows legal recognition
of a formal relationship between two opposite-sex people simply based
upon fact that the parties are opposite sexes.69 Two people could do
nothing more than acknowledge their commitment to one another by
registering as a couple after solemnization" and thereby become lawfully
married. The UMDA assumes that the parties are able to consummate the
union simply by the couples' opposite sex composition.7' Based upon the
language of the UMDA, a bisexual could, therefore, have no sexual de-
sire for, and never cohabitate or share finances with, her opposite sex
partner but legally marry anyway. The partners could, moreover, despise
one another. A bisexual person could announce at the wedding her sexual
63. Id. § 101 (amended 1973), 9A pt. I U.L.A. 171 (1998).
64. Id. § 102, at 171.
65. Id. § 201, at 175. To obtain a license in the registration process, the parties must present an
application with their sex noted. This statement will be used to verify that the parties are opposite
sex, or one man and one woman. If there is a question about the sex of a party, the birth certificate of
an individual is often consulted. See In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 829 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987). This
is why it is crucial for many transgender individuals to change their sex on their birth certificate.
66. In re Bailey's Estate, 423 N.E.2d 488 (111. App. Ct. 1981) (interpreting the formality
provision of the Act).
67. UMDA § 207, 9A pt. I U.L.A. 1183 (1998) (providing a list of what types of marriages are
prohibited including: (1) marriages between uncles and nieces and between aunts and nephews
except as permitted by "established customs of aboriginal cultures," (3) marriages between brothers
and sisters, (4) marriages between ancestors and descendants, and (5) marriages entered into prior to
the dissolution of a previous marriage).
68. See, e.g., Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
69. This requirement incorrectly presupposes that there are, in fact, only two sexes. See
Fausto-Sterling, supra note 47.
70. UMDA § 206, 9A pt. I U.L.A. 1182 (1998) (requiring parties to register and be
solemnized in order to obtain a marriage license).
71. Cf UMDA § 208(a)(2), 9A pt. I U.L.A. 186 (1998) (holding a marriage to be invalid if a
party lacks the physical capacity to consummate the marriage by sexual intercourse and the other
party was unaware of the incapacity at the time of solemnization).
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orientation and intent to remain identified and active as such but still
enjoy the legal recognition of her opposite sex relationship. Therefore,
this recognition is based solely on the sex (i.e., genitalia) of the partners,
and their potential to engage in PVP using that genitalia.
Thus, marriage under the UMDA is based upon the genitalia of the
parties. Facially, however, the UMDA does not provide any insight into
the purpose for the opposite sex/genitalia requirement. The criteria used
by courts deciding cases under the UMDA for declaring an attempted
marriage invalid more explicitly articulate that PVP is the precondition to
legal marriage. The UMDA outlines several reasons for invalidating a
marriage. A marriage can be declared invalid if a party was induced into
a marriage based on fraudulent grounds that relate to the essential ele-
ments of the marriage relationship,72 or if a party lacks the physical ca-
pacity to consummate the union."
The UMDA does not state what constitutes adequate grounds for
alleging fraud. Cases interpreting this provision of the UMDA provide
insight. In Woy v. Woy,74 a husband sought an annulment, alleging that
his wife failed to disclose her same-sex relationship history prior to their
marriage.75 At trial the wife denied she was a lesbian, but admitted she
had sexual relations with a woman before and during her marriage to her
husband. Her husband identified his wife as bisexual.7 The husband and
the wife had sexual relations during their ten-year relationship.
The Woy court held that the wife's same-sex activities "had noth-
ing to do with" the essential part of the marriage." The court reasoned
that because the marriage was sufficiently consummated, the wife's
"lesbian activities" did not interfere with her ability to engage in "nor-
mal" and "usual" sexual relations with her husband. 9 The court stated
72. UMDA § 208(a)(1), 9A pt. I U.L.A. 186 (1998). Courts shall also declare a union invalid
if a party lacked the ability to consent, the marriage was prohibited, or a party was not of the
appropriate age of consent. See id. § 208(a).
73. UMDA § 208(a)(2), 9A pt. I U.L.A. 1186 (1998). Consummate is defined as "to complete
[the] marital union by the first act of sexual intercourse after marriage." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1986). The UMDA section governing marriage invalidity was
intended to replace the traditional common law of annulments. In fact, this section purported to
completely abolish the traditional grounds used to determine marriage fraud. UMDA § 208, 9A pt. I
U.L.A. 186 (presenting the purpose for this section in the Comment following the specific provision
of the act).
74. 737 S.W.2d 769 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
75. Woy, 737 S.w.2d at 770.
76. Id. at 771.
77. Id. (stating that when he spoke with his wife about her relationship with another woman he
"realized that [his] wife was bisexual").
78. Id. at 773.
79. Id. at 774.
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that "the ... lesbian activities had nothing to do with the essential part
thereof of sexual intercourse."'
The court further determined that the wife did not have an affirma-
tive duty to disclose her same-sex sexual relationships prior to the mar-
riage.' This determination was based upon the fact that the wife did not
misrepresent her "lesbian" past, and mere non-disclosure did not rise to
the level of fraud entitling the husband to an annulment. 2 The court lik-
ened same-sex activities prior to marriage to unchastity, which a party
need not disclose to another party prior to marriage.83 In contrast, a party
must disclose pregnancy, venereal disease, sterility, and similar matters."
Notably, some of the things that must be disclosed (particularly venereal
disease or impotence) could affect the capacity for and desirability of
engaging in PVP. The court concluded that "annulment of marriage is the
exception and not the rule, and must be granted only upon extraordinary
circumstances."85
Woy demonstrates the centrality of PVP in defining a legal marriage
under the UMDA. First, the court in Woy disregarded the sexual orienta-
tion of the parties to marriage. While married, Ms. Woy engaged in bi-
sexual conduct by having sex with both men and women. The court mor-
ally condemned the wife's bisexuality (or bisexual conduct), stating that
"lesbian activities are reprehensible conduct not in accordance with the
normal mores of society," 6 but for legal purposes it decided that the sole
dispositive condition for the marriage was the existence of PVP.
The Woy decision further illustrates the dubious nature of the ar-
ticulated justifications for marriage laws that fence out gays and lesbians.
The UMDA purports to "strengthen the family" and "protect the institu-
tion of marriage." Yet the Woy court recognized that a woman can be
sexually active with women before and during her marriage, condemned
such behavior, but still upheld the marriage as valid, thus protecting the
union of opposite sexual genitals. The court overlooked adultery and
"homosexual" conduct because the necessary and dispositive element of
legal marriage-PVP-was present. Conservative groups, including the
Christian Coalition and Focus on the Family, however, would arguably
assert that the Woy court weakened the family unit.
80. Id. at 773.






87. See Al Knight, Primary System Distorts Christian Coalition Views, DENV. POST, Feb. 25,
1996, at DI (detailing the ideals of the Christian Coalition, an organization that was founded by
Republican Pat Robertson, that includes right-wing issues such as anti-choice, prayer in schools, and
anti same-sex marriage efforts); Michelle Mahoney, Focus on the Family Sets Compass by Bible,
DENV. POST, Nov. 28, 1995, at El (explaining the conservative, Colorado Springs based group and
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An additional insight offered by Woy relates to Ms. Woy's admis-
sion of engaging in sexual acts with both men and women while married.
Had Ms. Woy been in the military, her conduct and admission could
have justified her discharge. " Had Ms. Woy been a recent immigrant to
this country and admitted such conduct in a petition for permanent resi-
dency, the INS could have denied her petition.' The same conduct, how-
ever, did not preclude legal recognition of marriage because the only
relevant conduct was PVP.
Additional court decisions under the UMDA illustrate that marriage
is based upon the potential for PVP much more than any companionship
ideal. Courts uphold marriages when entered into solely for the purposes
of financial gain or under false pretenses of love and affection. In
Henderson v. Ressor,° for example, the court validated an ostensibly
heterosexual marriage despite the fact that the sole reason for the union
was to inherit property at the spouse's death." In Nebbitt v. Nebbitt,92 the
court held that a woman's failure to disclose her lack of love and affec-
tion for her husband did not give rise to a fraud suit in tort. Neither
Henderson nor Nebbitt required any showing of companionship between
the spouses. Parties can marry for financial gain or without love, com-
mitment, or affection as long as the parties are able to engage in PVP.
One additional case provides further support for the premise that
PVP is central to legal marriage. In Freitag v. Freitag,9' the court dis-
missed an annulment action filed by the wife who claimed that the hus-
band had concealed his "homosexual tendencies."' Three weeks after the
marriage, the husband became impotent.95 Two to three weeks following
the onset of impotence, the husband confessed his history of homosexu-
ality prior to the marriage.'
Despite both the husband's history of homosexuality and the onset
of impotence, the court refused to annul the marriage. 7 In reaching its
decision, the court noted that prior to the marriage, the couple had been
"intimate." Additionally, the couple cohabitated upon their return from
its central message of "preserving and strengthening the home" according to the Bible's teachings).
Arguably, these right-wing groups might like the PVP focus because of its essentialist and narrow
focus.
88. See infra note 108.
89. See infra Part I.
90. 126 S.W. 203 (Mo. 1910).
91. The Henderson case continues to be cited as good law. See Charley v. Fant, 892 S.W.2d
811, 813 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (citing the Henderson case as an example of a legitimate marriage).
92. 589 S.W.2d 297 (Mo. 1979).
93. 242 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Sup. Ct. 1963).




98. Id. The court, however, did not define "intimate."
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a honeymoon." Because of this cohabitation, the court implicitly as-
sumed that the couple consummated the marriage (i.e., the husband
penetrated the wife) when it stated that the husband was "incapable of
further fulfilling his marital contract. '' "° Thus it was not cohabitation (or
companionship) itself which mattered, but cohabitation as indirect proof
of prerequisite PVP.
The Freitag court dismissed the action for two related reasons. First,
the case did not present a "true case of homosexuality.' '0 ' Second, the
court did not believe that "the condition of the defendant [was] incur-
able."'0 2 These statements illustrate the preeminence of PVP in evaluating
the validity of marriage. The husband clearly acknowledged his previous
homosexuality, but the court took pains to overlook this declaration. In
doing so, the court ignored the sexual orientation of one spouse, focusing
instead on the sexual component of the relationship and the future poten-
tial for PVP in the marriage.
As with the other marriage cases, the basis for granting state sanc-
tion of a marriage relationship does not turn on love or companionship,
or even sexual orientation. Instead, courts labor to overlook and dismiss
evidence of non-heterosexual orientation and its impact, leaving PVP as
the most important factor in distinguishing valid from invalid marriages.
In short, courts focus more on sexual behavior (i.e., consummation
through PVP) than sexual orientation or love and commitment in decid-
ing whether to legally recognize marriages.
b. The Defense of Marriage Act
Congress passed DOMA in 1996 to counteract the possibility that
states might legally recognize same-sex marriage.' 3 Congress offered
five main goals and rationales for DOMA: (1) encouraging heterosexu-
ality; (2) preserving government resources; (3) defending traditional no-
tions of morality; (4) defending and nurturing the institution of tradi-
tional, heterosexual marriage; and (5) reserving the institution of mar-
riage for procreation.' Despite precluding federal recognition of same-
sex marriage, DOMA allows bisexuals to be legally married. Applying
99. Id.
100. Id. (emphasis added).
101. Id. at644.
102. Id.
103. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906
("[DOMA] is a response to a very particular development in the State of Hawaii.... [T]he state
courts in Hawaii appear to be on the verge of requiring that State to issue marriage licenses to same-
sex couples:") (referring to Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), thatset the stage for Hawaii
to become the first state likely to recognize same sex marriage).
104. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 7 n.21, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2911 n.21
("Upholding traditional morality, encouraging procreation in the context of families, encouraging
heterosexuality-these and other important legitimate governmental purposes would be undermined
by forcing another state to recognize same-sex unions."); id. at 12, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2905, 2916 (listing "four of the governmental interests advanced by this legislation").
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each of the congressional rationales to a legal marriage with at least one
bisexual spouse reveals the disingenuousness and ineffectiveness of
DOMA and its rationales, and the fact that it is based on PVP. The appli-
cation of the DOMA rationales to an opposite-sexed bisexual in a legal
marriage reveals that the sole determinative criteria for granting legal
recognition of marriage is not heterosexuality, but rather the potential for
PVP.
The first rationale supporting DOMA (encouraging heterosexual
orientation) can be easily discarded as illegitimate."5 The fact that oppo-
site-sexed bisexuals become legally unionized does not change their sex-
ual orientation. Therefore, DOMA fails to encourage heterosexual ori-
entation by allowing bisexuals to be recognized as legal partners in legal
unions. If anything, DOMA encourages what might be called heterosex-
ual conduct, which might be distinguished from what the congressional
record seems to treat as heterosexual status. Just as the UMDA cases
disregarded one spouse's non-heterosexuality, DOMA does not require
bisexuals to forsake their orientation to be legally married. Thus, it does
not provide any incentive for heterosexuality. While limiting the institu-
tion of marriage to opposite-sex couples may provide an incentive for an
identity bisexual to partner with the opposite sex, the law focuses on
sexual conduct, not sexual orientation. The second rationale for DOMA
is similarly problematic. If protecting scarce governmental resources
were a legitimate concern, bisexuals would also be fenced out of the in-
stitution in an attempt to preserve the institution's benefits for the truly
deserving (read heterosexual).'" Thus bisexuality exposes the incoher-
ence of DOMA's rationales.
105. while illigitimate, this rationale is not lacking in coercive power. See Adrienne Rich,
Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in THE LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES READER
227 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993). Rich argues that there are many forces at work to coerce
women to partner with men. See id. at 227, 232-33. To the satisfaction of Congress, DOMA would
qualify as one of these forces. Rich, however, does not further argue that these forces convert
women into heterosexuals. In fact, she argues that women live on a continuum of lesbian identities
and that when women enter or live in a heterosexual union, it is not based upon their true or natural
"orientation" per se, but instead on the benefits of the union. See generally id. "A woman seeking to
escape such casual violations along with economic disadvantage may well turn to marriage as a form
of hope-for protection." Id. at 235.
106. Furthermore, current legally unionized couples with a bisexual member should face a
decrease or elimination of the financial benefits accorded by the government. There are many ways
to limit increased governmental spending on marriage without invidiously fencing out a group. The
justification of protecting government resources is clearly the only attainable, albeit circumspect,
goal. According to the GAO, marital status affects more than 1000 federal laws. See Letter from
Barry R. Bedrick, Associate General Counsel, General Accounting Office, to Henry J. Hyde, Chair
of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, (Jan. 31, 1997) (on file with the United
States General Accounting Office, available at <http://www.access.gpo.gov/su.docs/aces/
acesl60.shtml>, Report No. OGC-97-16). The GAO claims that conclusions cannot be drawn about
DOMA's overall affects on these laws because any particular law may disadvantage or advantage
married or single persons. See id. However, the summary of categories of laws affecting marital
status illustrates that marital status imparts far more financial benefits than disadvantages to married
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The third rationale for DOMA (defending traditional notions of mo-
rality) also proves illusory when analyzed through the lens of bisexuality.
The view of bisexuality as aligned with gay, and therefore morally re-
pugnant, permeates our society.'7 Many members of Congress express
this view.' 8 Therefore, by allowing bisexuals entry into legal marriage,
the institution becomes "morally contaminated." Yet DOMA fails to
exclude bisexuals from marriage. If those in Congress who supported
DOMA intended to uphold traditional morality, these members should
have required a sexual orientation litmus test upon. application for a mar-
riage license. But this practice, just like requiring a test to determine pro-
creative ability and desire, may well be unconstitutional.'"
Congress attempted to distinguish between moral and immoral un-
ions in DOMA's legislative history by distinguishing heterosexuality
from homosexuality. To do so, Congress juxtaposed heterosexuals with
homosexuals. For example, the legislation states that: "Civil laws that
permit only heterosexual marriage reflect and honor a collective moral
judgment about human sexuality. This judgment entails both moral dis-
approval of homosexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexuality
couples. See id. Because all of the other justifications are unfounded and unattainable, protecting
heterosexual wealth remains as the only feasible justification. Preserving heterosexual economic
superiority exposes the intent to fence out a particular group simply because it threatens another's
economic situation. Also, this argument inaccurately assumes that the government would be unable
to extend resources. See generally John D'Emilio, Capitalism and Gay Identity, in POWERS OF
DESIRE: THE POLITICS OF SEXUALITY 100 (Ann Snitow et al. eds., 1983) (arguing the development
of capitalism provided the framework for the emergence of gay individuals and communities).
107. See, e.g., Rowland v. Mad River Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that the
termination of a bisexual school teacher was constitutional), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1009, 1017
(1995) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that "[n]othing in [Supreme Court] precedents requires that
result"); Timothy M. Tymkovich et al., A Tale of Three Theories: Reason and Prejudice in the Battle
over Amendment 2, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 287 (1997). Tymkovich represented the state of Colorado
in defending the anti-gay Amendment 2 before the U.S. Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620 (1996). Amendment 2 fenced out gays, lesbians, and bisexuals from the political process. See
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b (held unconstitutional in Evans, 517 U.S. at 635). The Tymkovich
article, mirroring the majority of Colorado voters, made no distinction between bisexuals and
"homosexuals" when discussing the validity of Amendment 2.
108. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994) (outlining the congressional Don't Ask, Don't Tell
policy). This policy equates bisexuality with homosexuality in stating: "A member of the armed
forces shall be separated from the armed forces if .... the member has stated that he or she is a...
bisexual . I... "d  § 654(b)(2).
109. A sexual orientation litmus test would likely be unconstitutional under two theories. First,
if opposite-sexed bisexual marriage applicants were required to assert a heterosexual identity, and
refused legal recognition if they did not, they could allege their fundamental right to marriage was
violated. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding the right to marry as fundamental).
In this case, an opposite-sexed bisexual would argue that any restriction of this right must be
supported by a narrowly-tailored, compelling state interest, a standard nearly impossible for the state
to meet. The second approach for challenging such a test is based on the First Amendment. A
bisexual, gay, or lesbian person could allege that basing marital benefits on an assertion or statement
of sexual orientation is a content-based law that violates the First Amendment. See generally Nan D.
Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REV. 1695 (1993) (arguing that an announcement
of homosexuality communicates an idea, not only a status or conduct).
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better comports with traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality." '
Bisexuals are conspicuously absent from this discussion. One may think
that it is not surprising for Congress to omit bisexuals, however, because
they are uniquely situated to fit the description of "heterosexual" by
choosing to marry a person of the opposite sex. While bisexuals may
choose to marry someone of the opposite sex, they, like gays and lesbi-
ans, are not legally allowed to not marry a partner of the same sex. As
previously discussed, the choice of partners is not determinative of bi-
sexual orientation."' In other words, when an opposite-sexed bisexual
becomes legally married, his or her sexual orientation does not change.
Identity bisexuals by definition retain their non-heterosexual sexual ori-
entation identity. Therefore, the institution is not exclusively "heterosex-
ual," calling into question Congress's traditional notions of morality. By
failing to require heterosexual orientation under DOMA, Congress failed
to meet its goal of preserving traditional notions of morality.
Bisexuality similarly reveals the bankruptcy of the fourth rationale
for DOMA. Congress and the President intended to defend "traditional,
heterosexual" marriage with DOMA. But if bisexuals can marry an op-
posite sex partner, the only tradition being protected is two people of the
opposite sex forming a legal union. The partnership at that point need not
be comprised of two heterosexuals and is not, therefore, a "heterosexual"
union in the sexuality sense."' Instead, the spouses would be legally un-
ionized and if they remained married, functional heterosexuals. Congress
and the President, however, apparently assume an opposite sex union
constitutes a "heterosexual" union (in the sexuality sense). To illustrate,
Congress stated that "society has made the eminently sensible judgment
to permit heterosexuals to marry." 3 Additionally, Congress stated:
"Civil laws that permit only heterosexual marriage reflect and honor a
110. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 15-16, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2919-20
(footnote omitted).
111. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
112. An argument can be made that when members of Congress use the term heterosexual, they
mean to invoke only notions of opposite sex pairings and never sexual orientation. One definition of
the term heterosexual is: "[O]f or relating to different sexes <[heterosexual] twins>." WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1063 (1986). This definition supports the argument that
Congress meant only opposite sex couples. However, Webster's definition of heterosexual lists the
above definition last. The first definition listed under the term heterosexual is: "[O]f or relating to or
characterized by heterosexuality <sexual relationships between individuals of opposite sexes are
[heterosexual]>" Id. Heterosexuality is defined as: "[T]he manifestation of sexual desire toward a
member of the opposite sex." Id. Finally, one last definition for heterosexual is: "[A] heterosexual
individual." Id. These definitions, the ones implicating notions of sexual desire, occupy a more
central place in the dictionary. Therefore, it is likely that Congress did not divorce notions of sexual
orientation from the use of "heterosexual." Also, when ideas of opposite sex are implicated, they are
associated with non-sexual partners, such as twins. Furthermore, by allowing only "heterosexuals" to
marry, Congress implicates the definition of heterosexual, which is "a heterosexual individual"
which in turn necessarily implicates sexual desire and sexual orientation.
113. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 14, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2918 (emphasis
added).
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collective moral judgment about human sexuality. This judgment entails
both moral disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral conviction that
heterosexuality better comports with traditional (especially Judeo-
Christian) morality.""'
The fact that bisexuals can marry their opposite sex partners shows
that DOMA fails to protect a "heterosexual" institution. Furthermore, the
fact that bisexuals legally can avail themselves of protected status and
financial benefits begs the question about what "traditional" union Con-
gress hoped to protect. What does it mean that despite congressional at-
tempts to reserve marriage for heterosexuals, bisexuals can and do
marry? This means, in part, that the ideal fails to achieve the desired re-
ality. The congressional ideal of only allowing state recognition of those
with a heterosexual orientation fails to play out in practice.
The fifth and final of DOMA's rationales, that DOMA reserves the
institution of marriage for procreation, is inherently empty. Congress
stated: "[Society] has a deep and abiding interest in encouraging respon-
sible procreation and child-rearing. Simply put, government has an inter-
est in marriage because it has an interest in children."" 5 This goal is illu-
sory in that fertility is not a prerequisite for legal marriage. Congres-
sional response to this fact is as empty as the ideal itself. "Surely no one
would propose requiring couples intending to marry to submit to a medi-
cal examination to determine whether they can reproduce, or to sign a
pledge indicating that they intend to do so. ' 6 Congress would likely
assert the same response to those who point out that bisexuals can marry,
thereby rendering the traditional and heterosexual ideals as illusory and
false. The appearance of tradition apparently matters to Congress, not the
reality that being partnered with a member of the opposite sex is not nec-
essarily synonymous with heterosexual status or identity.
Revealing bisexuals' ability to marry provides a trenchant critique
of DOMA. If all of the goals forwarded by Congress are incoherent,
there must be some unarticulated, additional reason for DOMA. This
unarticulated goal is certainly not to legally recognize love and compan-
ionship. Congress even specifically states that "it is not the mere pres-
ence of love that explains marriage.""' But not only is love insignificant,
it is nonexistent in DOMA and our marriage doctrine. Congress can point
to no provision in DOMA that codifies a "love" requirement. Congres-
sional analysis of marriage in DOMA shows that the real reason for
DOMA is to affirm PVP as a prerequisite for legal unions. First, Con-
114. Id. at 15-16, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2919-20 (footnote omitted).
115. Id. at 13, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2917.
116. Id. at 14, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2918.
117. Id. at 13, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2917. The legislative history contains many
quotes about the lack of significance of love in the legal marriage relationship. One example is: "The
question of what is suitable for marriage is quite separate from the matter of love . I..." d. (quoting
Professor Hadley Arkes, Amherst College).
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gress uses "heterosexual" synonymously and interchangeably with "op-
posite-sex." For example, Congress defined marriage as the partnership
between one man and one woman,"8 and further set out its regulatory
purpose as "defend[ing] the institution of traditional heterosexual mar-
riage'.""9 Congress also contends that "the uniform and unbroken rule has
been that only opposite-sex couples can marry."'' " If opposite-sex pair-
ings neither guarantee nor represent procreative ability, an alternative
reason for the requirement must exist. As in UMDA case law, the oppo-
site-sex criterion must then be a euphemism for PVP. Logically, this
conduct-based understanding of opposite-sex pairings, then, is the poten-
tial for or actual occurrence of PVP.
Under DOMA and the UMDA, bisexuals enjoy state sanction of
their opposite sex relationships. Courts and legislators bestow such
privilege upon them simply because of their opposite-sex unions. Justifi-
cations for DOMA rest upon tradition and encouraging moral families.
Bisexuality, however, does not fit within commonly accepted societal
notions of "moral" or "traditional," as evidenced by societal discrimina-
tion against bisexuals. Bisexuals, nonetheless, are free to marry under the
UMDA, indicating that the only necessary criterion for marriage is geni-
talia deemed necessary to engage in PVP.
II. COMPANIONSHIP AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION MATTER IN
IMMIGRATION LAW
Although the general family law rule for granting legal recognition
to couples turns on the capacity for PVP, a different rule may apply in
other doctrinal areas. 2 ' Congress generally relies on the union of a man
and woman, or more accurately a penis and a vagina, as a basis to protect
the institution of marriage. Under DOMA and the UMDA, simply being
"opposite-sex" entitles a couple to marital benefits. Congress, however,
does not apply this conduct-based standard in all cases. Specifically, this
approach does not apply to immigrants who either marry upon arriving in
this country or who hope to join their spouses in the United States.'22 The
Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments'" (IMFA) prevent an immi-
grant from attaining immediate permanent legal status in the United
118. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, sec. 3, §7, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified
at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. It 1996)); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 30, reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2934.
119. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2906.
120. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2907.
121. The rule could be described as a "marriage-plus" situation. A "marriage-plus" situation
exists when litigants present a court with not only a marital, family law issue, but an additional issue
legislated by Congress or interpreted by the courts.
122. The treatment of marriage in the immigration context best illustrates this "marriage-plus"
situation. The marriage plus situation at issue here is marriage plus immigration.
123. Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
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States, even if s/he is married to a United States citizen."4 Instead, an
immigrant married to a U.S. citizen is only granted permanent residency
on a two-year conditional basis.'
In order to obtain permanent legal status, the immigrant must dem-
onstrate that the marriage was not entered into for the purpose of "pro-
curing an alien's entry as an immigrant."'26 The immigrant and her or his
citizen spouse are required to demonstrate a good faith marriage by filing
a petition detailing that the marriage was: (1) entered into in accordance
with state law, (2) valid at the time of petition, and (3) not entered into
for the purpose of gaining legal status for the immigrant.' 2 The immi-
grant and her or his citizen spouse also must meet personally with a rep-
resentative from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) so the
representative can determine whether the couple entered into the mar-
riage in good faith.'28 The statute further requires individuals to prove the
legitimacy of their relationship. Evidence of this legitimacy includes
pledges of commitment, cohabitation, and a disavowal of the purpose of
attaining legal status from the union. The interviews are quite invasive.
INS officials question the man and woman separately to determine
whether they each know the details about the other's daily lives.'" In
determining the legitimacy of the marriage, courts consider "evidence
relating to the degree of commitment by both parties to the marital rela-
tionship""'3 which includes considering all "relevant evidence.""' Courts
have interpreted the requirements of the "good faith" requirement to
mean, in part, that the parties intended to "establish a life together" at the
time of their marriage. 32 Thus, the IMFA, as interpreted, requires proof
of a genuine companionship.
124. 8U.S.C.§ 1186a (1994).
125. Id. § 1186a(a)(l).
126. Id. § 1186a(b)(1)(A)(i). The immigrant must also remain married from the time of entry
through the time of receiving his or her permanent status. Id. § 1 186a(b)(1)(A)(ii).
127. Id. § 1186a(d)(1)(A)(i). The petition must also include the address of each party since the
immigrant obtained permanent residence on a conditional basis. Id. § l186a(d)(1)(B)(i). This
requirement implies that it is essential for the immigrant and spouse to live together in order for the
immigrant spouse to attain permanent residence.
128. Id. § 1186a(c)(1)(B), (d)(3). The Attorney General, or designee, may waive the
requirement of an interview if s/he feels it is appropriate to do so. Even before the Amendments
were enacted, the INS met with immigrant spouses to determine the validity of the marriage. See
James A. Jones, Comment, The Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments: Sham Marriages or
Sham Legislation?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 679, 681 (1997).
129. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to
Recognize Same-Sex Marriages, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 745, 804 n.227 (1995).
130. Chand v. INS, No. 96-70901, 1997 WL 415348, at *1 (9th Cir. July 24, 1997).
131. Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e)(2) (1998).
132. See, e.g., Chand, 1997 WL 415348, at *1 (quoting Bu Roe v. INS, 771 F.2d 1328, 1331
(9th Cir. 1985)).
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In 1986, Congress enacted the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendments to curtail "fraudulent marriages."' 3 At that time the INS
asserted that close to 30 percent of petitions for immigrant visas involved
"suspect marriages."'' Since 1986, the INS disclaimed this statistic and
admitted that the number of people attempting to obtain legal status
through marriage was and is much lower.'35 Despite this acknowledg-
ment, the Amendments remain in force.
One example of the companionship requirement under immigration
law is found in Chand v. INS.'' Deciding that the marriage at issue was
not entered into in good faith, the court relied on the fact that the couple
did not see each other for eleven months after the wedding.33 Similarly,
in Gamboa-Garibay v. INS,'3 ' the court found a marriage to be fraudulent,
in part, because a spouse could not provide any documents of shared
residence.' In Gamboa-Garibay, the court also considered the fact that a
witness who often visited the couple could not give specific details about
what the couple did together during the these visits.'4 ' The court reached
its conclusion by disregarding the testimony of numerous witnesses who
testified on the petitioner's behalf as lacking credibility.'4'
Juxtaposing the INS amendments with DOMA illustrates the differ-
ent and contradictory federal approaches to marriage. DOMA accepts
without question the marriage of a man and a woman (both presumed to
be heterosexual) as a basis for social and legal entitlements. A couple
need do nothing more than present their opposite sex composition to a
court of law'42 to obtain legal recognition as a valid marriage.'3 Even that
133. H.R. REP. No. 99-906, at 1, 6 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5978, 5978.
Congress hoped to curtail such fraud while also supporting and encouraging the policy of family
unification. Immigrant spouses are given special consideration under our immigration laws in order
to achieve such a policy. This special policy, according to Congress, led to abuse and fraud when
used by immigrants who married solely to obtain United States citizenship or residency. Id. at 6,
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5978, 5978.
134. Id. Congress adopted this statistic as one basis for enacting the Amendments.
135. See Michelle J. Anderson, Note, A License to Abuse: The Impact of Conditional Status on
Female Immigrants, 102 YALE L.J. 1401, 1411 n.60 (1993) (stating that one of the highest rates of
"marriage fraud," according to the INS, is approximately 15 percent in the Los Angeles area but that
the INS estimates an average percentage closer to 8 percent). The Amendments primarily burden
female immigrants and have been amended to include waivers for battered women. See generally id.
(examining the effect of the INS amendments and subsequent regulations on immigrant women).
136. No. 96-70901, 1997 WL 415348 (9th Cir. July 24, 1997).
137. Chand, 1997 WL 415348, at *1.
138. No. 94-3399, 1995 WL 568347 (7th Cir. Sept. 20, 1995).
139. Gamboa-Garibay, 1995 WL 568347, at *3.
140. Id.
141. Id. In another case, Chungong v. INS, the court mentioned as noteworthy that although a
party could supply a legal marriage certificate, the party could not produce any photographs or
invitations of the event. No. 96-2103, 1997 WL 295628, at *2 (4th Cir. June 4, 1997).
142. Presuming of course that the union was appropriately solemnized and registered.
143. An annulment, however, is always an option for a party to a marriage who has evidence
the marriage was not a valid one. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.a.
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declaration is not necessary in most circumstances since opposite-sex
couples usually just claim their marital status on hospital, tax, estate, or
other forms. In contrast, due to congressional concerns about marriage
fraud, immigration laws require much more than mere opposite sex un-
ions to form valid marriages. INS representatives are allowed to ask ap-
plicants about their companionship, and even their sexual orientation to
determine the validity of a marriage. ' "
For purposes of federal law, different regulations of marriage apply.
Under DOMA, when two opposite sex persons unite, there is not con-
templation of fraud. A man and a woman who are legal residents or citi-
zens in this country could arrive at the justice of the peace, declare that
they do not love one another and their sole intention is to get financial
perks, and still receive approval from the state.'45 A bisexual could simi-
larly arrive at the courthouse with an opposite sex spouse, denounce het-
erosexuality, pledge to live in an open manner as a bisexual, but none-
theless receive legal recognition and financial benefits based solely on
the genital match at the altar."4
Why then does federal law codify this inconsistency? One possibil-
ity is xenophobia. The disparate treatment of immigrants manifests not
only in the marriage context but also in welfare laws'4 and educational
systems.' A second possible explanation for the different approaches to
marriage is that heightened romantic or companionship requirements for
immigrants provide assurance that the immigrant also has a source of
financial support, and is, therefore, at a lower risk for burdening the gov-
ernment, or becoming a "public charge." However, this argument could
actually work in the converse; once individuals marry, even if their mar-
riage lacks commitment or romance, they are entitled to a wide range of
economic support from their spouse, including fair property division,
support, and maintenance. This fact might encourage, rather than dis-
courage, a lower threshold for legitimacy, so as to guarantee a source of
support. A third possible explanation is that the IMFA grants immigrants
144. See, e.g., Garcia-Jaramillo v. INS, 604 F.2d 1236, 1239 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that
testimony offered at a deportation about an immigrant's homosexuality in an attempt td determine
the legitimacy of his marriage was not prejudicial).
145. See Henderson v. Ressor, 126 S.W. 203, 208-09 (Mo. 1910). But see Patricia A. Cain,
Same-Sex Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY: A REVIEW OF LESBIAN & GAY
IssuEs 97, 98 (1991) (finding that legally married couples do not always enjoy financial benefits,
specifically they have faced some tax burdens such as the "marriage penalty").
146. See supra Part I.B.2.
147. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1613 (West Supp. 1998) (prohibiting legal immigrants, with few
exceptions, from receiving means-tested public benefits for five years after their entry into the
United States). Congress also stated that legal immigrants should "not depend on public resources to
meet their needs." Id. § 1601(2)(A).
148. See generally Alaine Patti-Jelsvik, Note & Comment, Re-educating the Court: Proposition
187 and the Deprivation of Education to Undocumented Immigrants, 18 WHITTIER L. REV. 701
(1997) (discussing the components of Proposition 187, one of which denied undocumented
immigrant children elementary and secondary public education access).
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a benefit, rather than punishes them. This argument rests on the fact that
immigrants usually do not receive any type of conditional residency or
expedited review, except in the marriage context. While this argument
frames the treatment accorded to immigrants as positive or privileged
because their petitions receive expedited review if they are married, the
reality still exists that compared to legal residents and citizens, immi-
grants must fulfill heightened and additional requirements in order for
their unions to be recognized as legally valid and deserving of financial
and societal privilege.
The divergent congressional approaches to regulating marriage
complicate the questions regarding marriage regulation and merit further
discussion. The IMFA focus on companionship in marriage, however,
does not invalidate this Note's conclusion about PVP in marriage due to
the unique nature of the immigration context.' 9
III. THE MISCHARACTERIZATION OF THE PVP NATURE OF MARRIAGE
The previous discussion illustrates that legal marriage depends upon
actual or potential penis-vagina penetration. As the UMDA and trans-
gender cases show, neither sexual orientation nor love nor companion-
ship matters for most marriage regulation. The Woy court, for example,
treated a bisexual as heterosexual as long as she engaged in PVP. Under
that court's approach, as long as a person is willing to engage in PVP, the
PVP relationship (marriage) will be recognized, notwithstanding the
spouse's non-heterosexual sexual orientation. Woy, then, could be inter-
preted as furthering heterosexist principles by treating opposite-sexed
bisexuals more favorably than gays or lesbians. More fundamentally, the
court overlooked sexual orientation altogether. The court based its deci-
sion not on the sexual orientation of the parties, but on their capacity for
PVP.
The transgender cases similarly illustrate that legal marriage de-
pends on conduct (PVP) rather than heterosexual status. The transgender
individuals in these cases were never questioned about their sexual ori-
entation. Instead, their ability to marry rested on their physical ability to
perform one particular sex-act: PVP. Finally, Congress articulated the
opposite sex requirement for marriage in DOMA, which fronts for the
ability to consummate a union, i.e., engage in PVP.
Notwithstanding the doctrine that dictates that legal marriage de-
pends on sexual conduct-PVP-the courts and Congress attempt to
characterize marriage as status-based. The following discussion explores
two reasons for the mischaracterization of marriage as status-based. First,
the mischaracterization serves to reify and elevate heterosexual identity.
149. The unique nature is one of a "marriage-plus" situation. See supra notes 121-22.
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Second, the mischaracterization perpetuates the exclusivity of the insti-
tution of marriage.
A. How Courts and Congress Mischaracterize Marriage as Status-Based
Congress mischaracterizes marriage as status-based by equating the
opposite sex requirement-shown earlier to be the PVP requirement-
with heterosexual status, stating "society has made the eminently
sensible judgment to permit heterosexuals to marry.""'5 The institution of
marriage also gets characterized as status-based when the participation of
bisexuals in the institution is ignored and dismissed. In other words, mar-
riage can only be characterized as heterosexual by dismissing the reality
that bisexuals legally marry."'
In a related context, Janet Halley states: "Not knowing what sodomy
is, not naming it at all, not describing it accurately, not acknowledging its
presence, are all important parts of its historical profile. Obscurity is part
of what sodomy is, a means by which it attains its social effects."'5 2 The
same can be said about bisexuality in the context of legal marriage. Bi-
sexual invisibility perpetuates the myth that marriage is exclusively het-
erosexual and based on status rather than sexual conduct.
By not acknowledging bisexuality, legal marriage can be constructed
as purely heterosexual. A nuanced understanding of the bisexual
identity,' therefore, exposes the institution of legal marriage as one that
includes various sexual orientations. In essence, acknowledging that
identity bisexuals remain bisexual notwithstanding their participation in a
legal marriage reveals that legal marriage includes multiple sexual ori-
entations.
Failing to acknowledge bisexuals as active participants in legal mar-
riage also perpetuates the myth and conservative ideal that legal marriage
consists of two heterosexual partners. DOMA's legislative history re-
veals not only a lack of acknowledgment, but a labored attempt to con-
struct and present legal marriage as an exclusive union of two hetero-
sexuals. For example, Congress presents DOMA as a "heterosexual-only
marriage law."'" This "heterosexual" myth excludes gays and lesbians
from the institution. By being constructed as exclusively heterosexual,
the institution self-perpetuates as exclusively heterosexual. For example,
150. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 14 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2918
(emphasis added).
151. Just as Sedgwick argues the open secret of the closet has been central to the definition of
modem Western thought, the open secret of bisexuality has been central to the construction of legal
marriage. See Sedgwick, supra note 48, at 48-49. The open secret is this: bisexuals exist and exist in
both heterosexual and homosexual communities (as well as bisexual communities). The participation
of bisexuals in heterosexual communities, while known, remains unnamed and unanalyzed.
152. Halley, supra note 58, at 1757.
153. See supra Part I.B.1.
154. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 16, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2920 (emphasis
added) (stating that DOMA adheres to the moral teachings of heterosexual-only marriage).
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the law constructs marriage to be about heterosexuals. Because it is
about heterosexuals, it is thereby only for heterosexuals."' Halley ex-
plains how sodomy similarly conflates status and conduct:
"'[H]omosexual sodomy' has become homosexuals as sodomy."'' 6 Under
the legal institution of marriage, "heterosexual marriage" has, similarly,
become "marriage as heterosexuals." When one considers that bisexuals
enter the institution, however, it becomes apparent that the current insti-
tution of marriage is not only about heterosexuals but also about bisexu-
als.'57 The institution instead turns on the present or future acts of PVP,
not the sexual orientation status of the spouses.
Admittedly status and conduct cannot be cleanly separated as if dis-
tinct aspects of a person. Status can implicate conduct and vice versa: the
two are co-constitutive. A wealth of rich scholarship explores the com-
plexities of the relationship between status and conduct.'58 Most relevant
for the purposes of this Note is why the institution of marriage is socially
and legally constructed as status-based, specifically as heterosexual.'59
B. Why Marriage Is Mischaracterized As Status-Based
Strategically characterizing legal marriage as based on heterosexual
status serves a purpose. As Janet Halley argues, deconstructing like char-
acterizations "exposes the political nature of that equivocation."'" In
other words, Congress and courts further a political purpose by errone-
ously equating PVP conduct with heterosexual orientation. First, the
characterization perpetuates the myth that marriage is inherently or tra-
ditionally for heterosexuals-not gays and lesbians.'6 ' This equation is
intimately tied to both sexism and heterosexism:
155. This is the definitional approach used to fence out gays and lesbians from marriage. See
Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (using definitional approach to uphold denial
of marriage license to two males). Singer defines marriage as the union between a man and a
woman. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1191-92. Thus, because the union is only about men and women it can
only be for men and women. William Eskridge found that this is the most common articulated
approach for the defense of opposite-sex marriage. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-
Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REv. 1419, 1427-28 (1993).
156. Halley, supra note 58, at 1734.
157. See generally Bi ANY OTHER NAME: BISEXUAL PEOPLE SPEAK OUT (Loraine Hutchins &
Lani Kaahumanu eds., 1991) (presenting personal anecdotes of married bisexuals).
158. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA.
L. REv. 1551 (1993); Halley, supra note 58; Francisco Valdes, Sexual Minorities in the Military:
Charting the Constitutional Frontiers of Status and Conduct, 27 CREIGHTON L. REv. 381 (1994).
159. The point I am arguing here is not that classification based upon acts is bad, undesirable,
or harmful per se. In fact, classifying based upon acts promises to offer opportunities for liberation
and equality. See Halley, supra note 58; Mezey, supra note 55. What this Note argues is that the type
of conduct-PVP--that marriage depends upon is unprincipled and illegitimate.
160. Halley, supra note 58, at 1733.
161. William Eskridge found that "[t]he main argument against same-sex marriage is
definitional: marriage is necessarily different-sex, and therefore cannot include same-sex couples."
See Eskridge, supra note 155, at 1427. Congress uses this definitional argument to further argue that
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For efficient subordination, what's wanted is that the structure not
appear to be a cultural artifact kept in place by human decision or
custom, but that it appear natural-that it appear to be a quite direct
consequence of facts about the beast which are beyond the scope of
human manipulation or revision. It must seem natural that individuals
of the one category are dominated by individuals of the other and that
as groups, the one dominates the other.
16
1
Since marriage is constructed as crucial to social ordering, it is es-
sential for equivocation to occur. This equivocation legitimizes the social
privileges afforded to heterosexuals in other contexts. For example, sex-
ual regulations harken back to traditional notions of morality and appro-
priate intimacy,63 the very notions that create and perpetuate the current
institution of marriage. Thus, without such equivocation, the privileged
nature of the heterosexual orientation in other contexts may be called
into question.'" In essence, if courts and Congress were clear that sexual
orientation fails to matter in marriage, then it could be argued that orien-
tation should not form the basis for discrimination in other contexts.
In addition, equating heterosexual identity with sex acts illustrates
the permeability and fluidity of the heterosexual status. Instead of con-
stituting a coherent status with essential attributes and characteristics that
justify the granting of legal subjectivity, heterosexuality depends upon
the union of opposite sets of genitalia, and nothing more. In recognizing
legal unions, the law does not care about who each partner had partnered
with, who they will partner with, or how they will order their intimate
relationship and how this constructs or impacts identity.'65 All the law
marriage is exclusively for heterosexuals by equating opposite-sex with heterosexual. See H.R. REP.
No. 104-664, at 2 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906.
162. MARILYN FRYE, THE POLITICS OF REALITY: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 34 (1983)
(citing Paulo Freire's writings as the genesis for such a theory).
163. See generally Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996)
(codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. 11 1996) and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West Supp. 1998)); Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (utilizing, in part, the "ancient roots" of proscriptions against
sodomy to uphold anti-sodomy statute); H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 12-18 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2916-22 (setting forth governmental interests advanced by DOMA).
164. One obvious context is the military, wherein pronounced heterosexuals receive
preferential treatment. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994). Even though the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy
does not per se exclude gays, lesbians, and bisexuals from the military (instead it prohibits
"homosexual conduct"), those thought to be non-heterosexual must prove that they do not possess
the propensity to engage in homosexual acts. Heterosexuals obviously receive preferential treatment
in almost every other societal context as well, except where there are laws prohibiting against anti-
gay discrimination. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 363.02-03 (West Supp. 1997) (prohibiting
discrimination against gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgendered individuals).
165. This is not to say that the law does not involve itself with the marriage institution once it is
formed. In fact, most states, for example, impose a duty of support on spouses. See generally Amy
C. Christian, Joint and Several Liability and the Joint Return: Its Implications for Women, 66 U.
CIN. L. REv. 535, 617 n.75 (1998) (discussing the varied obligations of spouses regarding property
and support). Also, states regulate divorce which necessarily involves a state determination as to the
continued legal viability of a union. An in-depth discussion of divorce law is beyond the scope of
this Note. Moreover, this Note seeks, instead, to investigate the legal rationales and rules for
allowing certain unions to access the marital privilege.
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cares about is "what" one can do with specific genitalia. This reveals that
there is nothing particularly elevated or sacred or socially beneficial
about heterosexual marriage, unless one says that PVP is essential to
social organization.
Constructing marriage as a purely heterosexual (status based) insti-
tution instead of based upon a particular type of sexual conduct (PVP)
legitimizes privileges afforded to those just because they assert the status
heterosexual. In essence, the construction of legal marriage as an institu-
tion based on heterosexual status serves not to describe the institution but
instead to prescribe privileged treatment for those who claim the identity
in society. This analysis shows the incoherence of fencing out gays and
lesbians based upon a status based ideal because, as shown, marriage is
not status-based. Instead, the institution is based upon the capacity for
PVP which is curious, and, as shown next, illegitimate.
IV. PVP IS AN ILLEGITIMATE BASIS FOR CONFERRING MARRIAGE
BENEFITS
Determining legal marriage benefits on the capacity for PVP is an
illegitimate basis for providing state marital benefits.'" The PVP re-
quirement perpetuates heteropatriarchy'67 and subordinates both women
and sexual minorities. The PVP requirement subordinates women be-
cause it reifies and encourages traditional gender roles (as symbolized
through the PVP sex act). One traditional gender role being reified and
encouraged is that it is appropriate (or natural) for men and women to
have sex with the opposite sex but not the same sex. If a woman or man
is not able or willing to perform this act then they are not a proper (or
true) woman or man. Requiring PVP for legal marriage encourages and
assures that traditional sex and gender roles will be continued. The first
and most fundamental of these roles is either penetrating or being pene-
trated by the opposite sex. Thus, a proper woman for the purposes of
marriage is a person who can be penetrated by a penis. A proper man is
the person who can penetrate the vagina.
Andrew Koppelman has argued that laws which discriminate
against gays and lesbians reinforce male hierarchy, thereby oppressing
women. '68 Koppelman argued, as have many writers and scholars, 69 that
166. Congress appears to implicitly agree that determining national policy on the basis of the
sexual act of PVP was illegitimate by the omission of any mention of such a requirement. Although
the omission also serves the purpose of legitimating the status of heterosexual, see supra notes 153-
57 and accompanying text, it also is a clear indictment of the illegitimacy of such a position. This is
further proven true because Congress relied on three rationales relating to sexual orientation and
marriage for DOMA, none of which were rational, true, or logical. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.b.
167. See Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the Conflation of Sex,
Gender, & Sexual Orientation to Its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 161, 162, 168-70 (1996).
168. See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 198 (1994).
169. See, e.g., SUZANNE PHARR, HOMOPHOBIA: A WEAPON OF SEXISM (1988).
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the taboo against homosexuality is virtually synonymous with the taboo
against "sex-inappropriateness.""'7 The taboo against homosexuality,
thus, re-enforces traditional sex roles. This taboo, explains Koppelman,
"assumes the hierarchical significance of sexual intercourse and the pol-
luted status of the penetrated person."'7 ' Koppelman arrived at this con-
clusion based upon the similarities between the taboo against miscege-
nation and the taboo against homosexuality. Koppelman has shown that
the miscegenation taboo presumed that penetration possessed hierarchi-
cal significance, with whites dominating blacks and men dominating
women.' 2 Penetration signifies power; thus, being penetrated signifies
powerlessness. Disallowing mixed race marriage protected whites from
being penetrated by those who threatened the power structure. The ban
on same sex marriage, then, protects men from being penetrated by other
men. This legal scheme prevents men from inhabiting the place of the
polluted and protects men's status as the penetrator and powerful. In es-
sence, based on the homosexuality taboo, many segments of society ref-
use to tolerate sodomy because the penetration of a man reduces "men"
or "maleness" to the same polluted status as woman or female. Koppel-
man further states:
Implicit in [the] taboo are the premises-incompatible with equal
concern and respect for all citizens-that sexual penetration is a nasty
degrading violation of the self, and that there are some people (in the
case of the homosexuality taboo, women) to whom, because of their
inferior social status it is acceptable to do it . ... "'
In the marriage relationship, women necessarily occupy the polluted
position of the penetrated. This is so because legal marriage requires
PVP. Men then occupy an elevated position and women occupy a subor-
dinate position. Being penetrated also means any number of subordinat-
ing consequences. These consequences have been documented in case
law,"' journal articles,'75 and social science materials. 6 Some of these
consequences include the unequal division of labor in the home,'7 the
degree to which men are not held accountable for domestic violence and
170. Koppelman, supra note 168, at 235.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 224.
173. Id. at 236.
174. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding the Hyde Amendment that
restricted Medicaid funds for medically necessary abortions).
175. See, e.g., Koppelman, supra note 168, 224.
176. See, e.g., JOHN STOLTENBERG, REFUSING TO BE A MAN 91-100 (1989) (discussing and
documenting, as far back as the early eighties, the numerosity and consequences for women of
unplanned or unwanted pregnancies including financial hardship, lack of choice for abortions, and
lack of support from male partners for electing an abortion).
177. See Marion Crain, Between Feminism and Unionism: Working Class Women, Sex
Equality, and Labor Speech, 82 GEO. L.J. 1903, 1915 n.61 (1994) (citing numerous findings that
women perform a disproportionate share of the household work).
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marital rape, '78 and the financial ruin many women face upon the dissolu-
tion of the union.
79
Adrienne Rich also discusses the institution of heteropatriarchy and
urges that heterosexuality be recognized as a "political institution."'
According to Rich, heterosexuality is such an institution because of the
many forces which discourage women from associating with other
women (both socially and erotically) and possessing women-identified
values.' Thus, if not for the overwhelming number of forces that either
punish women for being without a man or make it difficult or near im-
possible for women to be without a man, women would more fully real-
ize their connection to or desire for other women.
While Rich's theory can be criticized on many fronts, particularly
for essentializing women in general and more specifically lesbians,' 2 it
provides a helpful context within which the PVP requirement can be
understood. Allowing only opposite sexed couples tO marry by itself
works as a force to encourage male and female coupling.'83 Rich states
that a "woman seeking to escape disadvantage may well turn to marriage
as a form of hoped for protection."" However, the PVP requirement
does even more; it perpetuates heteropatriarchy by providing financial
incentives to women to be penetrated by men. As discussed above, this
state sponsored penetration invokes and perpetuates the subordination of
women.
85
178. See Katharine K. Baker, Once a Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in Rape
Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 563, 574 (1997) (finding that marital rape is still legal in one state and
treated less seriously than stranger assault); Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107 HARv.
L. REV. 1181, 1193 (1994) (discussing the role and limitations of the state in assisting women,
including women who are victims of domestic violence).
179. See Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing Women's
Work Through Premarital Security Agreements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 17 (1998).
180. Rich, supra note 105, at 232 (emphasis omitted).
181. Id. at 232-34. Some of the forces which discourage women's identification with other
women but that support male power include: sexual terrorism (including rape and sexual
harassment), domestic violence, abortion and contraception laws, lack of compensation for work in
the home, and non and substandard education of women. Id. at 233.
182. Rich could be said to essentialize lesbians or lesbian desire as political. "[W]e may first
begin to perceive [lesbian existence] as a form of naysaying to patriarchy, an act of resistance." Id. at
239.
183. Congress agrees, although as previously discussed mistakenly focuses on the sexual
orientation instead of genitalia. See supra discussion Part I.B.2.b.
184. Rich, supra note 105, at 235.
185. 1 am not attempting to argue here that PVP is inherently oppressive for women. I could not
in good faith argue this position for this would minimize the pleasurable sexual aspect of such an act
for women, both heterosexual and opposite-sexed bisexual. I am not attempting to align myself with
writers like Andrea Dworkin who have argued that penetration of any kind is inherently oppressive.
See ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE 63-67, 122-23 (1987). Instead, I am calling into question the
governmental practice and custom of focusing on this act as a basis for recognizing legal unions. For
despite the sex positive outlooks on PVP, it carries with it a history and social significance in the
law. Thus, I call into question the central place PVP occupies in marriage law.
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Additionally, PVP is an illegitimate basis to determine governmen-
tal benefits because it is based on certain sexual activity. The PVP-based
marriage requirement reduces the marriage participants to sexual actors
and objects. Men and women receive recognition and benefits for what
they can do in bed, rather than what they actually do with the rest of their
lives in their relationship. For performing the requisite sex act, PVP, the
government confers numerous and abundant financial benefits.' s6 Spouses
also receive social benefits. Because legal marriage has nothing to do
with companionship and love, none of these benefits has anything to do
with love or companionship. Instead, these benefits reward those who
can engage in PVP.
An irony lurks here. Marriage law elevates, reveres, and encourages
one type of sexual conduct (PVP) while characterizing the institution to
be comprised of exclusively those with a heterosexual sexual orientation.
Thus, marriage law contributes to the construction of the heterosexual
identity as equivalent to PVP.'87 Unlike heterosexuals, however, margi-
nalized groups must devote a considerable amount of time debunking the
myth that they are hypersexual.'85 Without such defense, these groups are
at risk for perpetual vilification and misunderstanding. This objectifica-
tion significantly impacts marginalized groups in the law by creating bias
and prejudice. For example, the myth that gay male identity is defined by
sex informed the Justices who decided the anti-gay case of Bowers v.
Hardwick."9
On the one hand, then, heterosexuals' benefits depend on PVP while
courts simultaneously refuse protections or privileges for gays and lesbi-
ans due to the characterization, albeit inaccurate and unfounded, that
gays and lesbians are all about sexual conduct. Thus, marriage law cre-
ates a double standard for gays and lesbians. This double standard is an
illegitimate basis to fence out gays and lesbians from marriage. The judi-
ciary and government cannot justify basing an entire legal scheme of
financial benefits and burdens, and societal rights and responsibilities, on
sexual conduct, penis-vagina penetration, which implicates an entire
history and future of the subordination of so many,' while simultane-
186. See supra note 106.
187. Admittedly, marriage is not the only societal force that defines the heterosexual identity.
See Susan Sterett, Husbands & Wives, Dangerousness & Dependence: Public Pensions in the
1860s-1920s, 75 DENY. U. L. REV. 1181 (1998) (arguing that pension benefits given to widows
were instrumental in creating the heterosexual identity).
188. See generally Halley, supra note 58 (deconstructing the equivocation of gay and sodomy);
Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the
Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1437-45 (1991) (explaining that one prevalent image of
slave women, perpetuated today, is of the Jezebel, or "a woman governed by her sexual desires").
189. 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) ("It is obvious to us that neither of these formulations would
extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy. Proscriptions
against that conduct have ancient roots."); see Halley, supra note 58.
190. By exposing the unprincipled nature of the PVP requirement, this Note risks prompting
reform that takes an even more punitive and discriminatory position against gays, lesbians,
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ously refusing legal protections to gays and lesbians because of their
erroneous conflation with sexual conduct.
CONCLUSION
The transgender marriage cases, the UMDA, and DOMA reveal that
formal, legal marriage does not require or even consider love, compan-
ionship, commitment, or sexual orientation. Instead, marriage depends on
sexual conduct, specifically the act of penis-vagina penetration. Despite
the PVP (act-based) nature of marriage, Congress and the courts charac-
terize marriage as status-based, which works to further reify the institu-
tion and heterosexual orientation itself. One way this is done is by ig-
noring or dismissing the participation of bisexuals in legal marriage. This
act-based requirement is an incoherent and illegitimate basis for granting
governmental benefits because it perpetuates the subordination of margi-
nalized groups and creates a double standard for gays and lesbians. Also,
it is dubious at best to have a central social, political, and cultural insti-
tution turn on a particular sex act.
Bisexuals occupy a unique position in queer theory, being stealth
interlopers into the institution of marriage and exposing the disingenuous
and illusory nature of the rationales that are used to construct the institu-
tion as exclusively by and for heterosexuals. DOMA and the UMDA are
not explicit about this act-based understanding of marriage; bisexuals are
uniquely situated to expose the PVP requirement in these contexts. This
analysis reveals the progressive potential of theorizing around bisexual-
ity. This Note reveals that legal doctrine looks to the capacity for PVP as
determinative of marital eligibility, surely an illegitimate requirement for
the plethora of benefits attached to marriage. Moreover, it shows the
progressive potential of theorizing around bisexuality. Future incorpora-
tions of bisexuality in queer theory offer further opportunity to decon-
struct and reconstruct legal regimes.
transgendered individuals, opposite-sexed bisexuals, and women. This is always a risk, however,
when advocating for change. The goal of this Note is to expose the true illegitimate nature of present
marriage law with the hopes that future scholarship will continue to propose legitimate and inclusive
alternatives.
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